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Abstract. Reliable communication among avionic applications is a crucial pre-
requisite for today’s all-electronic ﬂy-by-wire aircraft technology. The AFDX
switched Ethernet has been developed as a scalable, cost-effective network, based
upon IEEE 802.3 Ethernet. It uses redundant links to increase the availability.
Typical consensus strategies for the redundancy management task are not fea-
sible, as they introduce too heavy delays. In this paper, we formally investigate
AFDX redundancy management algorithms, making use of Lamport’s Tempo-
ral Logic of Actions (TLA). Furthermore, we present our experiences made with
TLA
+ and the TLA
+ model checker TLC.
Keywords. Redundancy Management, AFDX, TLA, Model Checking, Case
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1 Introduction
Reliable communication between avionic subsystems is essential, especially as in 1988
with the Airbus A320 the all-electronic ﬂy-by-wire technology attained commercial air-
line service. There are established avionic data communication protocols such as AR-
INC 429 [2] and MIL-STD-1553 [16]. Recently, the desire for increased performance
and more cost-effective solutions has prompted the industry to also explore off-the-
shelf alternatives such as IEEE 802.3 Ethernet [14]. The Ethernet speciﬁcation, how-
ever, does not guarantee a maximum latency, as the package collisions are resolved
through a back off strategy that may lead to a possibly unbounded latency. That is why
the next-generation avionics data bus shall on the one hand allow usage of as much
cost-efﬁcient, IEEE 802.3 compliant hardware as possible and on the other hand shall
guarantee a certain bandwidth and Quality of Service, which includes specifying max-
imal transmission latency. These requirements have lead to the Avionics Full Duplex
? ? ? J. T¨ aubrich performed this work while at CAU Kiel.
y R. von Hanxleden performed part of this work while EADS Airbus, Hamburg/ToulouseSwitchedEthernet (AFDX),basedupon IEEE 802.3Ethernettechnology,whichisused
today in the Airbus A-380.
AFDX transmits network frames over redundant networks (see Figure 1) and these
redundant streams of frames get ﬁltered at the receiving end system (Figure 2). As it
turns out, the apparently simple problem of merging redundant streams of frames into
a single non-redundant stream is not trivial and enforces some trade-offs in terms of
availability, performance and resource requirements. A fairly thorough, but still infor-
mal investigation of this redundancy management (RM) problem has been performed
in 2001 by von Hanxleden and Gambardella (documented in an internal, unpublished
report [6]). This investigation appeared fairly thorough, but the apparent complexity
of the problem3 has prompted an interest in another, more formal investigation, using
Lamport’s Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [9] and the corresponding model checker
TLC [17] (documented in a diploma thesis [15]).
This paper summarizes the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst report and the subsequent formaliza-
tion. The main contributions are, on the one hand, a formal deﬁnition and investigation
of the redundancy management problem for frame-oriented communication protocols,
such as AFDX, and, on the other hand, a fairly involved case study on the use of TLA
and TLC for a safety-critical real-world problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The remainder of the introduction
covers the basics of AFDX and TLA+ and surveys related work. Section 2 presents the
basics of frame ordering. Sections 3 and 4 describe an environment for the RM algo-
rithms and the checked properties. Section 5 presents three alternative RM algorithms.
Sections 6 and 7 summarize our experiences made with TLA+, TLC, and the formal
investigation of the RM algorithms.
1.1 AFDX
AFDX addresses the shortcomings of Ethernet using concepts of Asynchronous Trans-
fer Mode (ATM) [5]. AFDX is a proﬁled network, meaning that conﬁguration tables
are loaded into switches at start-up. It is organized in a star topology with a maximum
of 24 End Systems (ES) per switch. Larger systems can be realized through cascading.
Standard Ethernet suffers the possibility of an inﬁnite chain of frame collisions and
hence an unpredictable delay of messages. Therefore every ES is connected to a switch
with two twisted pair cables, one pair for sending and the other for receiving frames,
which makes AFDX full duplex. Each switch has the capability to buffer multiple pack-
ages for each ES in each communication direction. Consequently buffer-overﬂows and
message delays due to congestion at the switch may cause erroneous behaviors. AFDX
emulates a deterministic point-to-point network through the use of Virtual Links (VLS).
Each VL builds a unidirectional path from one ES to one or maybe more other ESs. A
certain predeﬁned bandwidth is allocated for each VL, ensuring that the sum of alloca-
tions does not exceed the maximum available bandwidth of the whole network. AFDX
can be run with either 10 Mbps or 100 Mbps. A minimal bandwidth and a maximum
latency for end-to-end transmission is guaranteed.
3 The original report contained 75 pages of rather terse technical writing, including 37 corollar-
ies and 86 ﬁgures, most of which concerned with different communication scenarios. As far as
such ﬁgures are meaningful, this does suggest a certain complexity of the problem.Transmit Receive
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In order to improve the reliability AFDX provides a redundant network scheme.
Each frame is transmitted in parallel over two redundant networks and afterwards ﬁl-
tered by RM at the receiving ES (Figure 1). This shall reduce the probability of loos-
ing frames and enable further operation even in presence of one faulty network. This
redundancy has to be managed somehow, which leads to the task of redundancy man-
agement (RM). We consider RM to be part of the receiving ES. The task of RM can be
formulated quite simply: forward all received frames to the application, but eliminate
redundant copies. Hence redundancy shall be transparent to the application.
Each frame has ﬁrst to pass integrity checking (see Figure 2). A basic form of in-
tegrity checking could just check if a frame is well-formed (e.g., whether it contains a
correct CRC ﬁeld). A more involved integrity check could validate whether the received
frame was expected to be delivered next. Integrity checking, however, is not considered
in this paper. It is assumed that integrity checking ﬁlters frames in a way that all frames
reaching the RM are well-formed. No further assumptions about integrity checking are
made.
1.2 Related Work
The technical problem addressed here, namely how to merge redundant streams of com-
municated frames (packets) into a single logical stream, should occur rather frequently
in safety-critical applications. However, we have found that there is comparatively little
published systematic work on this. A general approach to simplify modular speciﬁca-
tions of dependable distributed systems is given by Sinha and Suri [12]. They proposeto deﬁne building blocks to specify and verify larger protocols. These blocks can be
consensus, broadcast, redundancy management and many more. However, they do not
go into further detail on how to specify these building blocks, as has been investigated
in this paper for the redundancy management task.
Tanenbaum [14] gives a basic introduction about computer networks in general.
Advanced topics on ATM and switched Ethernet are considered in Goralski [5] and
Breyer [3].
Temporal logic was introduced by Pnueli [11] to describe system behaviors, a com-
plete overview is given by Manna and Pnueli [10]. Most speciﬁcations consist of or-
dinary mathematics, however, temporal logic is important for describing system prop-
erties. The system properties deﬁne what a system is supposed to do and the speciﬁed
automaton describes its real behavior. If the speciﬁed behavior implies the conjunction
of the properties, the system behaves correctly with regard to the deﬁned properties. In
principle, a system’s behavior could be deﬁned with a single formula using this formal-
ism. In Pnueli’s logic, however, it can be hard to deﬁne certain properties of systems.
TLA [8]isavariantofPnueli’soriginallyproposedlogic.TLAwasdevelopedtopermit
the simplest, most direct formalization of assertional correctness proofs of concurrent
systems. TLA+ [9] is a speciﬁcation language for concurrent and reactive systems that
combines the temporal logic TLA with full ﬁrst-order logic and Zermelo-Fr¨ ankel set
theory. A very short introduction to the TLA+ syntax is given in Lamport [7]. One main
reason why we selected TLA+ for formulating the redundancy management problem
and associated algorithms was the ability to decompose speciﬁcations into modules
and to specify reusable functions. Sommerfeld provides a case study on TLA+ [13].
TLDA [1] extends TLA to compositionally specify distributed actions. TLC [17] is a
modelcheckerfordebugginga TLA+ speciﬁcationbycheckinginvarianceandliveness
properties of a ﬁnite-state model of the speciﬁcation.
2 Ordering Frames
The redundancy management task requires to eliminate redundant as well as outdated
frames. Consider two frames with equal content. What is needed to decide whether one
frame is the redundant copy of the other? First we need to know from which network a
frame was delivered. Two frames delivered by the same network cannot be redundant
copies of each other. Furthermore an order of frames received from a network must be
established. A common approach to identify and order frames is to include a sequence
number (SN) in each frame. However, a problem here is that SNs are not really unique:
since the number of frames sent is not a priori bounded and there are only limited
resources for sequence numbers (in our case an 8-bit ﬁeld), SNs eventually must wrap
around. The following considerations address the problem of frame ordering with ﬁnite
sequence numbers.
The number of sequence numbers is SN CNT =def 28. Thus the maximum se-
quence number is SN MAX =def SN CNT   1. The mid-point sequence number
is denoted as SN HALF =def SN CNT=2. Consecutive frames have a sequence
SN(fi+1) =def (SN(fi) + 1) mod SN CNT, where SN maps frames to sequencenumbers, fi denotes frame i, and i is some conceptual frame index denoting sending
sequence.
In a ﬁrst step towards comparison operators for the above deﬁned sequence numbers
we deﬁne subtraction on sequence numbers as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Sequence Number Subtraction) The subtraction operator  SN is:
s1  SN s2 =def ((s1   s2 + SN HALF) mod SN CNT)   SN HALF:
It can be seen that for sequence numbers within a range of SN HALF and without a
wrap around the subtraction of sequence numbers (“ SN”) is equal to common sub-
traction on natural numbers modulo SN CNT and can be used to establish an order on
the frames. To order sequence numbers correctly even in the presence of wrap arounds,
with the known restrictions on the range of the sequence numbers, the SN HALF gets
involved into the deﬁnition. Deﬁnition 1 can be used to deﬁne the following comparison
operators.
Deﬁnition 2 (Comparison Operators)
s1 <SN s2 ,def (s1  SN s2) < 0;
s1 =SN s2 ,def (s1  SN s2) = 0;
s1 >SN s2 ,def (s1  SN s2) > 0:
To prove the correctness of the operators is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
corollary below should enable a straight forward proof. The unwrapped sequence num-
ber USN(f ) is needed to reason about sequence number operations. This number is
a theoretical number for each frame f , which does not wrap around and thus is un-
bounded. In the following, reset refers to setting the sequence number count to zero;
this occurs when an ES gets rebooted.
Corollary 1. Let frames f1 and f2 be generated without intermediate sequence num-
ber reset, and let s1 and s2 be their respective sequence numbers. If jUSN(f1)  
USN(f2)j < SN HALF, then it is s1  SN s2 = USN(f1)   USN(f2)
Hence a correct ordering of frames using sequence numbers can be established if the
unwrapped sequence numbers differ at most by SN HALF.
3 The Environment
In the following we describe and formally specify an appropriate environment to each
of the tested redundancy management algorithms. Such an environment should feed the
RM with a well-formed stream of frames and provide information to reason about the
correctness of the redundancy management’s decisions. The ﬁrst step is to deﬁne the
set of actions that the environment can perform. An appropriate environment can either
send a frame, loose a frame, deliver a frame to the RM, reset the sequence number
count, disable one network due to failures or it just can do nothing for a certain time.
The interaction speciﬁcation of these allowed actions, hence the speciﬁed behavior
of the environment without the RM part, is deﬁned as in the TLA+ fragment shown inStep of the environment
EnvNext
∆ = ∃id ∈ networks : sendFrame ∨ die(id) ∨ reset
Step of the redundancy management system
SysNext
∆ = ∃hid, posi ∈ deliverable :
∨ extAcceptFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)
∨ extRejectFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)
∨ extWait
Step of whole model
Next
∆ = SysNext ∨ EnvNext
Fig.3. Step deﬁnition of environment without RM
Figure 3. (Note: for space considerations, we here refrain from a detailed explanation
of the TLA+ syntax, and would like to refer the reader instead to Lamport’s excel-
lent 7-page summary of TLA+ [7], which is also available on-line.) The deﬁnition of
EnvNext expresses that a step of the environment is either a send step, a step where a
single network dies (gets disabled), or a step that resets the sequence numbers. A frame
is represented as a pair of the transmitting network id and the position in the network
queue. SysNext, the system’s next step, states that a frame from the set of deliverable
frames may be either accepted or rejected, or that the environment can just do nothing.
All frames ahead of the currently delivered frame on the same network are considered
lost. So the loss of frames is implicitly deﬁned, which reduces the state space signiﬁ-
cantly (and hence speeds up model checking). Finally, the deﬁnition of Next states that
a step of the full model is either a step of the environment or a step of the system, which
can be directly mapped to a step of the redundancy management.
Providing an Oracle
A crucial point of the environments speciﬁcation is to enable reasoning about the cor-
rectness of the redundancy management algorithms, as the ones presented in Section 5.
To recognize faulty behaviors, a system must be introduced that, independently of the
actual program state, marks pending frames correctly, corresponding to their status as
either normal, redundant or old. A frame is considered to be normal iff no frame sent
later to any network has yet been received by the RM and its twin frame (i.e., its re-
dundant copy) has not yet been received. A frame is considered to be redundant iff its
twin frame has already been delivered to the RM. The remaining frames—which are
not redundant and where a later sent frame has already been delivered to the RM—are
considered old.
The environment sends its frames to both networks in parallel and only if both
networks still have capacity to buffer another frame. Thus for a given frame f from
network N1 it is
1. decidable whether f ’s twin frame is still transient on N2, and
2. possible to ﬁnd the position of f ’s twin frame in the sequence where it is located.
Figure 4 shows how an algorithm to mark all frames correctly with a minimum effort
is realized in TLA+. Figure 5 shows an example behavior. The ﬁrst two frames of eachtag[seq1 ∈ Seq([sn : (0 .. SN MAX), tag : {“n”, “r”, “o”}]),
seq2 ∈ Seq([sn : (0 .. SN MAX), tag : {“n”, “r”, “o”}]),
val ∈ (0 .. SN CNT), id ∈ networks]
∆ =
if Len(seq1) > Len(seq2) then
if Head(seq1)[TAG] = “r” then hHead(seq1)i ◦ tag[Tail(seq1), seq2, val, id]
else h[sn 7→ Head(seq1)[SN], tag 7→ “o”]i ◦ tag[Tail(seq1), seq2, val, id]
else h[sn 7→ Head(seq1)[SN], tag 7→ “r”]i ◦ Tail(seq1)
Fig.4. Marking algorithm in TLA+
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Fig.5. The Marking Algorithm, with example behavior (left) and result (right)
network are considered to be deliverable to the receiving end system. When the second
frame of N2 gets delivered, the marking algorithm takes N1 and N2 without the ﬁrst
frame as input. As long as N1 has more elements than the modiﬁed sequence N2, the
ﬁrst element of N1 is marked as old, if not already marked as redundant, and calls the
function recursively with the tail of sequence N1. If both sequences have equal length,
the algorithm marks the ﬁrst frame in N1 as redundant and terminates, as can be seen in
Figure 5. A full discussion of this algorithm and a correctness proof, based on Floyd’s
inductive assertion method for transition diagrams [4], can be found in [15].
4 The Properties
Traditionally an algorithm is examined to satisfy safety and liveness properties, stating
that it behaves correctly and does not block. This is not appropriate in our situation
as, before our formal investigation, we did not expect any of the redundancy manage-
ment algorithms to be completely safe, which means neither forwarding redundant nor
outdated frames to the application layer. The proposed algorithms in von Hanxleden [6]
were not designed to satisﬁy these safety requirements at all circumstances. That is why
we reﬁned the original properties relative to the behavior of the environment, e.g. one
property allows the behavior to reset the sequence numbers, while a relaxed property
would prevent such resets. This should help to distinguish the different algorithms and
to decide about their quality. Besides safety and liveness a third class of requirements
addresses properties regarding the quality of an algorithm. This includes the proper-
ties concerning the per frame loss as well as special scenarios with only one connected
network. A fourth class of requirements, availability, addresses the behavior of the al-
gorithms in case of network failures. As for the safety requirements, several reﬁnement
steps were deﬁned to distinguish the analyzed algorithms. To give a complete descrip-
tion of all properties is beyond the scope of this paper, and we will restrict ourselves to
give representatives of each of the four classes of properties. However, the numbering
of the properties corresponds to the original thesis [15].4.1 Safety
What does safety mean for RM? First of all, the RM shall not submit any redundant
frames to the application layer. Secondly the RM shall preserve the order of frames and
hence shall not submit old frames to the application layer. Each of these tasks can be
weakened accordingly to the benignity of the environment.
Redundancy 2: If the environment does not reset anymore, the RM stabilizes and
works properly from that time on.
Redundancy2
∆ = 32¬[reset]v
⇒ 32(∀hid, posi ∈ deliverable :
enabled hextAcceptFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)iv
⇒ env.frames[id][pos][TAG] 6= “r”)
The premise of the TLA+-formula expresses that from some state i on, all consecu-
tive states n ! m are neither a reset nor a stuttering step. If this holds the redun-
dancy management algorithm shall, after a ﬁnite time, only accept frames which are not
marked as redundant.
Order 1: No old frame shall ever be submitted to the application layer.
Ordering1
∆ = ∀frame ∈ out : frame[TAG] 6= “o”
Obviously this is a very rigorous claim, which we expect to be failed by most of the
proposed algorithms. Nevertheless this claim can be relaxed in the same way we relaxed
the claim to never accept redundant frames to what is deﬁned above in Redundancy 2.
4.2 Liveness
Of course the redundancy management algorithms shall not deadlock as long as it re-
ceives frames from its environment. More speciﬁcally:
Liveness: Each frame that is delivered to the RM will be either accepted or re-
jected.
Liveness
∆ = ∀hid, posi ∈ deliverable :
∨ enabled hextAcceptFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)iv
∨ enabled hextRejectFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)iv
It is expected that all algorithms will satisfy this property as they are all of type: IF
condition = TRUE THEN accept ELSE reject, which implies that there exists a unique
decision for each frame. That is why we do not mind that our formula is stronger than
needed as this formula reasons about all frames and not only the set of received frames.
It is enough to know that the Liveness formula implies absence of deadlocks.
4.3 Quality
One of the original requirements [6] states that the redundancy management shall main-
tain the availability of a single network. In other words, it shall not increase the number
of frames lost that would be obtained with one of two networks normally running andalone. This is a difﬁcult, but important demand. Assume a fast but unreliable, hence
lossy network A and a slower, completely reliable network B. It follows that an algo-
rithm would need to use buffering to solve this problem. Buffering is considered harm-
ful since it produces possibly large delays. So a gradation was introduced to obtain a
more realistic estimation for the performance of the algorithms.
Quality 0: If only one network is connected to the RM, all received frames are
forwarded.
Quality0
∆ = 2(∀id1, id2 ∈ networks : isAlive[id1] ∧ ¬isAlive[id2])
⇒ 2(∀hid, posi ∈ deliverable :
¬enabled hextRejectFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)iv)
Hence, if the RM receives only frames from one network, the whole ES shall behave as
with only one network running alone.
Quality 1: If both networks are alive and at least one member of a Twin Frame
reaches the RM, one member gets submitted.
Quality1
∆ = ∀id ∈ networks, pos ∈ (1 .. MCFL) :
∧ isAlive[id]
∧ isAlive[TNid[id]]
∧ hid, posi ∈ deliverable
∧ enabled hextRejectFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)iv
⇒ ∃frame ∈ out : frame[SN] = env.frames[id][pos][SN]
Quality 1 is equivalent to the original requirement, but it is easier to formalize that if
a frame gets rejected, its twin frame has already successfully passed the redundancy
management algorithm.
4.4 Availability
The goal of redundancy is to raise the availability of a system by duplicating parts
of a system. In our case communication is done over multiple networks, since one
single network is not reliable enough. The Quality requirements are concerned with the
availabilityofthesystemincaseofbothnetworksoperating.Nowthecaseisconsidered
that one network dies. This is the most important part of the properties. Redundancy is
used to remain operating in presence of partial failures. These properties tell us how
good an algorithm serves this task and ﬁnally enables a ﬁnal decision whether this
algorithm is a feasible choice.
Avail 1: If one network fails, all consecutive frames of the other, remaining network
are accepted.
Avail1
∆ = ∃id1, id2 ∈ networks : (isAlive[id1] ∧ ¬isAlive[id2])
⇒ (∀hid, posi ∈ deliverable :
¬enabled hextRejectFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)iv)
An algorithm that satisﬁes this property would be a preferred choice (unless it fails all
other requirements). Although this formula looks similar to Quality 0 they describe dif-
ferent behaviors of the environment. While Quality 0 speciﬁes that from the beginning
only one network is operating, Avail 1 speciﬁes that one network fails during execution.Obviously an algorithm that handles absence of one network correctly at any time, it
especially handles the situation where only one network operates from the beginning
correctly. Hence Avail 1 ) Quality 0 holds. To satisfy this formula, it would help if the
RM could detect whether a network is down; this task, however, was explicitly moved
to the Network Management.
Avail 2: If one network fails and no reset occurs from that time on, all consecutive
frames of the remaining network are accepted.
Avail2
∆ = 2( ∧ 2(status 6= “reject”)
∧ ∃id1, id2 ∈ networks : (isAlive[id1] ∧ ¬isAlive[id2])
⇒ (∀hid, posi ∈ deliverable :
¬enabled hextRejectFrame(id, env.frames[id][pos][SN], pos)iv))
5 Three Redundancy Management Algorithms
Of the thirteen RM algorithms considered in the original report [6], we now present
a selection of three algorithms. As with the environment, the ﬁrst step to model the
algorithms behaviors is to deﬁne appropriate actions. This speciﬁcation of actions is
trivial, because all the RM can do is to receive a frame and decide whether it should
submit or discard it.
5.1 RMA1
Recall that the Sequence Number (SN) of frame f is SN(f ) 2 f0:::SN MAXg. The
Received Sequence Number of frame f is denoted as RSN(f ) and it may be SN(f ) 6=
RSN(f ). However we assume those frames with SN(f ) 6= RSN(f ) are not well-
formed and thus discarded by the integrity checking. The Previous Twin Network Frame
PTN(f ) for a frame f received on network N1 denotes the last frame received on the
other network N2.
Deﬁnition 3 (Sequence Number Skew) The Sequence Number Skew (SNS) of frame f is
SNS(f ) =def RSN(f )  SN RSN(PTN(f )):
This leads to the ﬁrst RM algorithm considered here: RMA1 speciﬁes to “accept a
frame if and only if its sequence number skew is positive”. The corresponding TLA+
speciﬁcation is given in Figure 6.
The formal analysis of RMA1 with TLC revealed that this algorithm works cor-
rectly if both networks are operational. However, if one network fails, RMA1 at some
point starts rejecting frames from the remaining network due to the ﬁnite sequence
numbering, as illustrated in Figure 7. This violates the property Avail 2. Moreover the
algorithm will periodically discard non-redundant frames.
5.2 RMA3
As an evolution from RMA1, the next RM algorithm considered here compares not only
the sequence numbers between frames of different networks, but also the difference of
successive frames of the same network. Let PAF(f ) be the previously (from the RMA)
accepted frame, prior to the reception of a frame f .Accept frame if frames are available and (SNS(f ) > 0)
acceptFrame(id, sn)
∆ =
∧ snSkew[id, sn] > 0
∧ rm0 = [rm except !.rsn = sn, !.ptn[id] = sn]
Reject frame if frames are available and SNS(f ) < = 0
rejectFrame(id, sn)
∆ =
∧ snSkew[id, sn] ≤ 0
∧ rm0 = [rm except !.rsn = sn, !.ptn[id] = sn]
Fig.6. Speciﬁcation of RMA1
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Fig.7. Silent Network Scenario—Using RMA1. The upper time lines indicate frames
received along the redundant network, along with their corresponding Sequence Num-
ber Skews. The lower time line indicates frames that RMA1 lets through to the applica-
tion.
Deﬁnition 4 (Previously Accepted Sequence Number) Let f be a frame with SN(f ) 2
f0:::SN MAXg. Then the Previously Accepted Sequence Number (PASN) of f is
given by
PASN(f ) =def RSN(PAF(f )):
Deﬁnition 5 (Sequence Number Offset) The Sequence Number Offset of a frame f is
given by
SNO(f ) =def RSN(f )  SN PASN(f )
RMA3 speciﬁes to “accept if and only if the maximum of the sequence number skew
and the sequence number offset is positive”. The corresponding TLA+ speciﬁcations
to accept or reject the currently received frame are shown in Figure 8. Note how paf
keeps track of accepted SNs. Model checking RMA3 proved that this algorithm will
handle network failures better than RMA1. In case of a faulty network and no reset of
the sequence number this algorithm will accept all subsequent frames. But as it turns
out, RMA3 still needs two operating networks to cope with sequence number resets.
5.3 RMA13
The last algorithm considered here, RMA13, circumvents this limitation by introducing
the concept of time. TLA+ allows the modeling of continuous real-time aspects. Un-
fortunately, a ﬁrst, very detailed timing model was not checkable with TLC, becauseAccept frame if frames are available and (SNS(f ) > 0 or SNO(f ) > 0)
acceptFrame(id, sn)
∆ =
∧ ∨ snSkew[id, sn] > 0 ∨ snOﬀset[sn] > 0
∧ rm0 = [rm except !.rsn = sn, !.paf = sn, !.ptn[id] = sn]
Reject frame if frames are available and SNS(f ) < = 0 and SNO(f ) < = 0
rejectFrame(id, sn)
∆ =
∧ snSkew[id, sn] ≤ 0 ∧ snOﬀset[sn] ≤ 0
∧ rm0 = [rm except !.rsn = sn, !.ptn[id] = sn]
Fig.8. Speciﬁcation of RMA3
Exceed time bound:
wait
∆ = ∧ rm.time = true ∧ rm0 = [rm except !.time = false]
Accept frame if frames are available and SNS(f ) > 0
acceptFrame(id, sn)
∆ =
∧ ∨ rm.pan = “all” ∨ id = rm.pan ∨ rm.time = false
∧ rm0 = [rm except !.pan = id, !.time = true]
Reject frame if frames are available and SNS(f ) < = 0
rejectFrame(id, sn)
∆ =
∧ rm.pan 6= “all” ∧ id 6= rm.pan ∧ rm.time = true
∧ rm0 = [rm except !.time = true]
Fig.9. Speciﬁcation of RMA13
of state explosion. However, since the only real-time aspect in the redundancy man-
agement algorithms is a time-out, we could model this as a another ordinary action in
TLA+ that can occur under speciﬁc circumstances. RMA13 is speciﬁed to “accept if
and only if the frame has the same network identiﬁer as the last accepted frame or after
time out”. The corresponding TLA+ speciﬁcation is given in Figure 9. Note that in ad-
dition to the already known actions to accept or reject a frame, an action is introduced
to model that the maximum time between two successive accepted frames is exceeded.
RMA13 actually deviates from the ﬁrst valid wins strategy, meaning that the ﬁrst valid
twin frame should always be passed to the application. Model checking revealed that,
although RMA13 may cause a higher per frame loss than other algorithms, it behaves
best in critical situations like network failures and sequence number resets. The most
important advantage of RMA13 is that it satsﬁes all safety properties, which means that
it never submits redundant or outdated frames to the application layer.
A complete and thorough analysis of the remaining algorithms would exceed the
bounds of this paper. The interested reader can ﬁnd the complete analysis in the the-
sis [15].
6 Assessment of the RMA Algorithms and their Formal Modeling
In summary, the formal analysis results indicate that one of the simplest proposed al-
gorithms, RMA13, is the best choice overall. Although it does not increase the macro-scopic availability, it satisﬁes all safety related properties, as it never submits redundant
or outdated frames to the application, which is considered more important for the redun-
dancy management task. Furthermore, the formal investigation of the RM task revealed
that the decision to have a relatively small sequence number range (only 8 bits, as op-
posed to 28 bits, as had been considered originally) is not only economical, but prevents
some catastrophic behaviors, too.
In our experience, TLA+ is very suitable to specify the redundancy management
algorithms. Though the compact notations of TLA+ might be a little bit confusing at
a ﬁrst glance, they are very practical and maintain a good readability. Moreover the
concept of untyped variables turned out to be not as error-prone as expected and is
indeed very ﬂexible.
The experience with the model checker TLC was also positive overall, but we did
encounter some complications and at times strange or (we think) even faulty behaviors.
TLC allows to check a wide range of expressible TLA+ properties, however, temporal
formulas that shall be checked with TLC and which contain actions must be of the form
23A (“always eventually A”) or 32A (“eventually always A”), where A denotes the
action. A work-around for this is to introduce another variable that records the action
actually taken and to use this variable instead of actions in the formulas.
The possibility of constraining inﬁnite models with specifying constraints on the
deﬁned variables is a major quality of TLC. Nevertheless the user must take care that
the speciﬁed and checked invariants not only hold on the constrained state space. TLC
checks for each state if all invariants hold and subsequently if all constraints are satis-
ﬁed. Thus a state, which is considered unreachable may cause a violation of an invari-
ant. This increases the complexity of optimizing the TLA+ speciﬁcations for model
checking with TLC.
A complete and more detailed description of the observed limitations can be found
in the original thesis [15].
7 Summary and Conclusions
Of course, model checking a large set of algorithms and properties has its limitations. In
our case, there is no way to give reliable conclusions of how many frames one algorithm
accepts and rejects. However, the formal speciﬁcation of the RM algorithms did detect
gaps in the original speciﬁcation. The speciﬁcation of one algorithm turned out to be
wrong, such that this algorithm failed all deﬁned properties.
Writing formal speciﬁcations forces the engineer to clearly express what an algo-
rithm must and what it must not do. The formalization effort presented here therefore
focused on stating a precise set of requirements, and checking which algorithms ful-
ﬁll which requirements. In contrast, the original, informal investigation followed an
evolutionary, scenario-based approach; it started with a simple RM algorithm, detected
scenarios where this RMA failed, and subsequently extended/modiﬁed the RMA. We
have noticed that some RMAs fail the same properties, however, behave differently
for certain scenarios. This suggests that the requirements in the formalization, which
were already signiﬁcantly reﬁned compared to the original report, still could be reﬁned
further.Acknowledgments
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